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Abstract—In this paper, we study the benefits of full-duplex
(FD) receiver jamming in enhancing the physical-layer security of
a two-tier decentralized wireless network with each tier deployed
with a large number of pairs of a single-antenna transmitter and
a multi-antenna receiver. In the underlying tier, the transmitter
sends unclassified information, and the receiver works in the half-
duplex (HD) mode receiving the desired signal. In the overlaid
tier, the transmitter deliveries confidential information in the
presence of randomly located eavesdroppers, and the receiver
works in the FD mode radiating jamming signals to confuse
eavesdroppers and receiving the desired signal simultaneously.
We provide a comprehensive performance analysis and network
design under a stochastic geometry framework. Specifically, we
consider the scenarios where each FD receiver uses single- and
multi-antenna jamming, and analyze the connection probability
and the secrecy outage probability of a typical FD receiver by
providing accurate expressions and more tractable approxima-
tions for the two metrics. We further determine the optimal
deployment of the FD-mode tier in order to maximize network-
wide secrecy throughput subject to constraints including the
given dual probabilities and the network-wide throughput of
the HD-mode tier. Numerical results are demonstrated to verify
our theoretical findings, and show that network-wide secrecy
throughput is significantly improved by properly deploying the
FD-mode tier.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, decentralized wire-
less networks (DWNs), full-duplex (FD), multi-antenna, self-
interference (SI), outage probability, secrecy throughput, stochas-
tic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION security in wireless communications hasattracted prominent attention in the era of information ex-
plosion. A traditional approach that safeguards the information
security is to use encryption at the upper layers of the com-
munication protocol stack. However, due to the dynamic and
large-scale topologies in emerging wireless networks, secret
key management and distribution is difficult to implement,
especially in a decentralized network architecture without
infrastructure [1]. In addition, it might not be practical for low-
power network nodes, e.g., sensors, to use complicated cryp-
tographic algorithms [1]. These pose a challenge to securing
information delivery solely by means of cryptography-based
security mechanisms. Fortunately, physical-layer security, a
novel approach at the physical layer that achieves secrecy
by exploiting the randomness inherent to wireless channels,
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has the potential to strengthen network security [2]. Since
Wyner’s ground-breaking work [3] in which he introduced the
degraded wiretap channel (DWTC) model and the concept of
secrecy capacity, physical-layer security has been studied in
various wiretap channels models, e.g., multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) channels [4], [5], relay channels [6], [7], and two-way
channels [8], [9], etc. A comprehensive survey on physical-
layer security, including the information-theoretic foundations,
the evolution of secure transmission strategies, and potential
research directions in this area, can be found in [10].
Early research on physical-layer security is focused on
a point-to-point scenario, in which the large-scale fading
is ignored when modeling the wireless channels, and as a
consequence secure transmissions become irrelevant to the
relative spatial locations of legitimate terminals and eaves-
droppers. When it comes to a decentralized wireless network
(DWN), since each network node suffers great interference
from the other nodes spreading over the entire network,
network security strongly depends on nodes’ spatial positions
and propagation path losses. Recently, stochastic geometry
theory has provided a powerful tool to analyze network
performance by modeling nodes’ positions according to a
spatial distribution, e.g., a Poisson point process (PPP) [11]-
[13]. This has facilitated the research of physical-layer security
with randomly distributed legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers
in DWNs [14]-[16].
To improve information transfer secrecy, an efficient way
is to degrade eavesdroppers’ decoding ability by sending jam-
ming signals. Along this line, some efforts have been made.
For example, the authors in [14] and [15] consider a single-
antenna transmitter scenario, and propose to let the transmitter
suspend its own information delivery and act as a friendly
jammer to impair eavesdroppers when it is far away from
the intended receiver [14] or when eavesdroppers are detected
inside its secrecy guard zone [15]. The authors in [16] consider
a multi-antenna transmitter scenario, and propose to radiate ar-
tificial noise1 with either sectoring or beamforming to confuse
eavesdroppers while without impairing the legitimate receiver.
Although these endeavors are shown to yield a significant
improvement on the secrecy capacity/throughput, they are
based on the presence of either multi-antenna transmitters or
friendly jammers, which sometimes might not be available. For
instance, due to the size and hardware cost constraints, a sensor
in a DWN, which transmits sensed data to a data collection
1 The idea of using artificial noise to interfere with eavesdroppers was
first proposed in [17]; this seminal work has unleashed a wave of innovation,
mainly including two branches, i.e., multi-antenna techniques [18]-[20] and
cooperative jamming strategies [21], [22].
2station, is usually equipped with only a single antenna. In
addition, a sensor has no extra power to radiate jamming
signals due to its low-power constraint. In these scenarios, the
jamming schemes proposed in [14]-[16] no longer apply, and it
is still challenging to protect information from eavesdropping.
Fortunately, the recent progress of developing in-band full-
duplex (FD) radios [26] raises the possibility of enhancing
network security in the aforementioned scenarios. In-band FD
operation enables a transceiver to simultaneously transmit and
receive on the same frequency band. The major challenge
in implementing such an FD node is the presence of self-
interference (SI) that leaks from the node’s output to its
input. Nevertheless, thanks to various effective SI cancellation
(SIC) techniques, SI can be efficiently mitigated in the analog
circuit domain [23], digital circuit domain [24], and spatial
domain [25], respectively. FD radios has the potential to
improve both link capacity and communication security in
DWNs. Returning to the aforementioned scenarios, i.e., with
single-antenna sensors and no friendly jammer, using a more
powerful FD data collection station provides extra degrees
of freedom to protect information delivery, e.g., radiating
jamming signals to degrade eavesdroppers while receiving
desired signals simultaneously. In particular, when the FD
receiver is equipped with multiple antennas, it provides us
with potential benefits not only in alleviating SI but also in
designing jamming signals.
We point out that sending jamming signals using an FD
receiver have already been reported by [27]-[29], where the
authors consider single-antenna receiver jamming with SI per-
fectly canceled in a cost-free manner, consider multi-antenna
receiver jamming with SI taken into account, and consider
both transmitter and receiver jamming, respectively. However,
these works are confined to a point-to-point scenario. When
considering a DWN, analyzing the influence of FD radios on
network security becomes much more sophisticated due to the
presence of not only the mutual interference between nodes
but also the SI. To the best of our knowledge, the potential
advantages of FD jamming in the context of physical-layer
security from a network perspective are elusive, and a funda-
mental mathematical framework for performance analysis and
network design is lacking, which has motivated our work.
A. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we investigate the physical-layer security of
a two-tier heterogeneous DWN under a stochastic geometry
framework, where single-antenna transmitters (sensors) and
multi-antenna receivers (data collection stations) in each tier
are organized in pairs. The first tier is an underlying tier
that has no secrecy requirement and each receiver therein
works in the half-duplex (HD) mode. The second tier is an
overlaid tier that has secrecy considerations and is deployed
with more powerful FD receivers. For convenience, we name
the two tiers the HD tier and the FD tier throughout the paper,
respectively. Randomly located multi-antenna eavesdroppers
intend to wiretap the secrecy data flowing in the FD tier. The
reasons why we consider this model are:
• This model characterizes a practical communication sce-
nario where a security-oriented network is newly de-
ployed over an existing network that has no security
requirement. For example, a military ad hoc network
specifically for secret information exchange such as of-
fensive tactics, is momentarily added to a civilian ad
hoc network, or an unlicensed security secondary tier
in an underlay cognitive radio network should make its
interference to the primary tier under control to guarantee
smooth communications for the latter.
• This is a more general DWN model that incorporates
communications with and without security requirements.
The secure decentralized ad hoc network models dis-
cussed in [15] and [16] are just special cases of our model
when we simply put aside the HD tier.
• In addition, investigating the achievable performances in
such a two-tier heterogeneous network facilitates us to
gain a better understanding of the interplay between the
classified and unclassified networks, and to evaluate the
impact of FD jamming to an existing communication
network without security constraint.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We analyze the connection probability and the secrecy
outage probability of a typical FD receiver under a
spatial SIC (SSIC) strategy, and provide accurate integral
expressions as well as analytical approximations for the
given metrics. We show that deploying more FD nodes
introduces greater interference to the network, which
not only decreases the connection probability but also
decreases the secrecy outage probability.
• We study the optimal deployment of the FD tier to
maximize network-wide secrecy throughput subject to
constraints including the connection probability, the se-
crecy outage probability, and the HD tier throughput.
In particular, when the FD receiver uses single-antenna
jamming, we prove the quasi-concavity of the secrecy
throughput with respect to (w.r.t.) the FD tier density;
the optimal density that maximizes secrecy throughput
can be obtained using the bisection method.
• For the multi-antenna jamming scenario, we investigate
how the number of jamming signal streams and the
number of jamming antennas affect secrecy throughput.
We reveal that increasing jamming signal streams always
benefits secrecy throughput. However, whether adding
jamming antennas is advantageous or not depends on
specific communication environments. A proper number
of jamming antennas should be chosen to balance trans-
mission reliability with secrecy.
B. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model and the underlying
optimization problem. In Sections III and IV, we provide
performance analysis and network design in single-antenna
jamming and multi-antenna jamming scenarios, respectively.
In Section V, we conclude our work.
Notations: bold uppercase (lowercase) letters denote matri-
ces (vectors). (·)H , | · |, ‖ · ‖, P{·}, and EA(·) denote Her-
mitian transpose, absolute value, Euclidean norm, probability,
3TABLE I: Key Symbols Used in the Paper
Symbols Definition/Explanation
Φh, Φf PPPs for Rxs in HD and FD tiers
Φˆh, Φˆf PPPs for Txs in HD and FD tiers
Φe, PPP for eavesdroppers
λh, λf , λe Densities of PPPs Φh (Φˆh), Φf (Φˆf ) and Φe
Nh, Nf Numbers of antennas at HD and FD Rxs
Ne Number of antennas at an eavesdropper
Nt Number of jamming antennas at an FD Rx
Nj Number of jamming signal streams at an FD Rx
Ph, Pf Transmit powers at Txs in the HD and FD tiers
Pt Power of jamming signals at an FD Rx
(x, xˆ) Locations of a Rx and its paired Tx
Dh, Df Distances between Tx-Rx pairs in HD and FD tiers
Dxy Distance between a node at x and a node at y
Pc, Pt Connection probabilities of HD and FD Rxs
Pso Secrecy outage probability of an FD Rx
Ts Network-wide secrecy throughput of the FD tier
Tc Network-wide throughput of the HD tier
HD Tx-Rx FD Tx-Rx Eve
Fig. 1: An illustration of a two-tier heterogeneous DWN consisting of both
HD and FD tiers. Each HD (FD) Rx receives data from an intended Tx. The
ongoing transmission between the FD Tx-Rx pair is overheard by randomly
located eavesdroppers (Eves).
and expectation w.r.t. A, respectively. CN (µ, ν), Exp(λ) and
Γ(N, λ) denote the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and variance ν, exponential distribu-
tion with parameter λ, and gamma distribution with parameters
N and λ, respectively. Cm×n denotes the m × n complex
number domain. log(·) and ln(·) denote the base-2 and natural
logarithms, respectively. f (m) denotes the m-order derivative
of f . [x]+ , max(x, 0). The key symbols used in the paper
are listed in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a two-tier heterogeneous DWN in which an exist-
ing tier that provides unclassified services is overlaid with a
temporarily deployed tier that has classified services. In either
tier, each data source (Tx) has only a single antenna due to
hardware cost, and reports data up to its paired data collection
station (Rx); each Rx is equipped with multiple antennas for
signal enhancement, interference suppression, information pro-
tection, etc. In the underlying tier, the Tx sends an unclassified
message to the Rx, and the latter works in the HD mode, using
all its antennas to receive the desired signal. In the overlaid
tier, the Tx deliveries a confidential message to its Rx in the
presence of randomly located eavesdroppers, and the Rx works
in the FD mode, simultaneously using part of its antennas to
receive the desired signal and using the remaining to radiate
jamming signals to confuse eavesdroppers. An illustration of a
network snapshot is depicted in Fig. 1. We model the locations
of HD Rxs, FD Rxs and eavesdroppers according to indepen-
dent homogeneous PPPs Φh with density λh, Φf with density
λf , and Φe with density λe, respectively. We further use Φˆh
and Φˆf to denote the sets of locations of the Txs in the HD
and FD tiers, which also obey independent PPPs with densities
λh and λf according to the displacement theorem [35, page
35]. Wireless channels are assumed to experience a large-
scale path loss governed by the exponent α > 2 along with
flat Rayleigh fading with fading coefficients independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) obeying CN (0, 1). We assume
that each Rx knows the channel state information of its paired
Tx. Since each eavesdropper passively receives signals, its
channel state information is unknown, whereas its channel
statistics information is available, see e.g., [12]-[28].
Without lose of generality, we consider a typical Tx-Rx pair
in the FD tier and place the Rx at the origin o of the coordinate
system2. Note that the aggregate interferences received at the
typical FD Rx consist of the undesired signals from all the
Txs (except for the typical Tx) and the jamming signals from
itself and from all the other FD Rxs. The received signal of
the typical FD Rx is given by
yf =
√
Pffoˆosf,oˆ
D
α/2
f︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+
√
PtFoovo︸ ︷︷ ︸
SI
+
∑
zˆ∈Φˆh
√
Phfzˆosh,zˆ
D
α/2
zˆo︸ ︷︷ ︸
HD−tier undesired signals
+
∑
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
(√
Pffzˆosf,zˆ
D
α/2
zˆo
+
√
PtFzovz
D
α/2
zo
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
FD−tier undesired and jamming signals
+nf , (1)
where sf,zˆ (sh,zˆ) denotes the signal from the Tx located at
zˆ in the FD (HD) tier with E[|sf,zˆ|2] = 1 (E[|sh,zˆ|2] = 1);
vz ∈ CNt×1 denotes a jamming signal vector from the FD
Rx at z with E[‖vz‖2] = 1; n denotes thermal noise; Pf ,
Ph and Pt denote the transmit powers of the Txs in the
FD tier, in the HD tier, and of the FD Rxs, respectively;
fxy ∈ C(Nf−Nt)×1 (Fxy ∈ C(Nf−Nt)×Nt) denotes the small-
scale fading coefficient vector (matrix) of the channel from
the node at x to the FD Rx at y (Foo denotes the SI channel
matrix related to the residual SI after passive SI suppression
like antenna isolation, the entries of which can be regarded as
independent Rayleigh distributed variables [30]). It is worth
noting that, due to the fixed Tx-Rx pair separation distance
Df
3
, Dzˆo and Dzo in (1) are not independent; Dzˆo can be
2From Slivnyak’s theorem [36], the spatial distribution of all the other nodes
will not be affected.
3Fixing the Tx-Rx pair distance is quite generic when dealing with a DWN
with or without security considerations [15], [16], [31], [32], which allows
us to ease the mathematical analysis. Nevertheless, the results obtained under
this hypothesis can be easily extended to an arbitrary distribution of Df , as
referred to [11].
4expressed by Dzˆo =
√
D2zo +D
2
f − 2DzoDf cos θz , where
the angle θz is uniformly distributed in the range [0, 2π]. As
can be seen in subsequent analysis, the correlation between
Dzˆo and Dzo makes it challenging to derive analytically
tractable results for involved performance metrics.
As to the HD Rx located at b, since it suffers no SI, the
received signal is given by
yh =
√
Phhoˆosh,oˆ
D
α/2
h
+
∑
zˆ∈Φˆh\oˆ
√
Phhzˆosh,zˆ
D
α/2
zˆo
+
∑
zˆ∈Φˆf
(√
Pfhzˆosf,zˆ
D
α/2
zˆo
+
√
PtHzovz
D
α/2
zo
)
+ nh, (2)
where hxy ∈ CNh×1 (Hxy ∈ CNh×Nt ) denotes the small-
scale fading coefficient vector (matrix) of the channel from
the node at x to the HD Rx at y.
Similarly, for the eavesdropper located at e that is intended
to wiretap the data transmission from the typical Tx to the
typical FD Rx, the received signal is given by
ye =
√
Pfgoˆesf,oˆ
D
α/2
oˆe
+
√
PtGoevo
D
α/2
oe
+
∑
zˆ∈Φˆh
√
Phgzˆesh,zˆ
D
α/2
zˆe
+
∑
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
(√
Pfgzˆesf,zˆ
D
α/2
zˆe
+
√
PtGzevz
D
α/2
ze
)
+ ne, (3)
with gxe ∈ CNe×1 (Gxe ∈ CNe×Nt) the fading coefficient
vector (matrix) of the link from the node at x to the eaves-
dropper at e and
√
PtGoevoD
−α/2
oe the interference from the
typical FD Rx.
A. Wiretap Encoding and Performance Metrics
We consider a non-colluding wiretap scenario in which
eavesdroppers do not cooperate with each other and each
eavesdropper individually decodes a secret message. To safe-
guard information security, we utilize the well-known Wyner’s
wiretap encoding scheme [3] to encode secret information.
Let Rt and Rs denote the rates of the transmitted codewords
and the embedded secret messages, and Re , Rt − Rs
denote the rate of redundant information that is exploited
to provide secrecy against eavesdropping. If a Tx-Rx link
can support the rate Rt, the Rx is able to decode the secret
messages; this corresponds to a reliable connection event [15].
The connection probability of a typical FD Rx is defined as
the probability that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) of the FD Rx, denoted by SINRf , lies above an SINR
threshold βt , 2Rt − 1, i.e.,
Pt , P{SINRf > βt}. (4)
Similarly, the connection probability of an HD Rx is defined
by Pc , P{SINRh > βc}, where βc , 2Rc − 1 with Rc the
corresponding codeword rate.
If the channel from the Tx to any of the eavesdroppers can
support the redundant rate Re, perfect secrecy is compromised
and a secrecy outage event occurs [16]. The secrecy outage
probability is defined as the complement of the probability
that the SINR of an arbitrary eavesdropper at e, denoted by
SINRe, lies below an SINR threshold βe , 2Re − 1, i.e.,
Pso , 1− EΦe
[ ∏
e∈Φe
P {SINRe < βe|Φe}
]
. (5)
To evaluate the efficiency of secure transmissions in a DWN,
we focus on the performance metric named network-wide
secrecy throughput (unit: bits/s/Hz/m2), which is defined
as the averagely successfully transmitted information bits per
second per Hertz per unit area under a connection probability
Pt(βt) = σ and a secrecy outage probability Pso(βe) = ǫ
[15], [16], i.e.,
Ts , λfσR∗s = λfσ [R∗t −R∗e]+
= λfσ [log (1 + β
∗
t )− log (1 + β∗e )]+ . (6)
In (6), R∗t , log(1+β∗t ), R∗e , log(1+β∗e ) and R∗s = R∗t−R∗e
denote the codeword rate, redundant rate and secrecy rate at
a Tx in the FD tier, with β∗t and β∗e satisfying Pt(βt) = σ
and Pso(βe) = ǫ, respectively. Likewise, the network-wide
throughput of the HD tier under a connection probability
Pc(βc) = σc is defined by Tc , λhσcR∗c , where R∗c ,
log(1 + β∗c ) with β∗c satisfying Pc(βc) = σc.
We emphasize that the FD tier density strikes a non-trivial
tradeoff between spatial reuse, reliable connection, and safe-
guarding. On one hand, increasing the density of the FD tier
establishes more communication links per unit area, potentially
increasing throughput; meanwhile, the increased jamming sig-
nals introduced by newly deployed FD Rxs greatly degrade the
wiretap channels. On the other hand, the additional amount
of interference caused by adding new devices deteriorates
ongoing receptions, decreasing the probability of successfully
connecting Tx-Rx pairs. The overall balance of such opposite
effects on secrecy throughput needs to be carefully addressed.
Note that, from a network perspective, network designers
may concern themselves more with the network deployment
rather than optimizing other parameters like transmit or jam-
ming power, antenna number, etc. For example, in a security
monitoring wireless sensor network, network designers may
fix the transmit power of sensor nodes to their maximum
values for simplicity, but would modestly design how many
sensors should be scattered in order to satisfy the monitoring
requirement. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to determine the
deployment of the FD tier to achieve the maximum network-
wide secrecy throughput while guaranteeing a certain level of
network-wide throughput for the HD tier.
In the following sections, we deal with network design
by considering the scenarios of each FD Rx using single-
antenna (SA) jamming (Nt = 1) and using multi-antenna
(MA) jamming (Nt > 1), respectively. The reason behind such
a division is threefold:
1) In the SA case, SSIC can only be operated at the FD Rx’s
input using a hybrid zero-forcing and maximal ratio combining
(ZF-MRC) criterion; in the MA case, due to the extra degrees
of freedom, the FD Rx simply performs SSIC at the output
and just adopts the MRC reception at the input.
2) In the SA case, since the channel from the FD receiver’s
output to either the legitimate node or to the eavesdropper
5is a single-input multi-output channel, it is relatively easy to
analyze connection probability and secrecy outage probability;
in the MA case, either of the above channels is an MIMO
channel, which makes the analysis much more complicated,
e.g., analyzing the secrecy outage probability requires using
the theory from integer partitions.
3) In the SA case, we prove the quasi-concavity of network-
wide secrecy throughput w.r.t. the FD tier density, and calcu-
late the optimal FD tier density that maximizes network-wide
secrecy throughput using the bisection method; in the MA
case, due to the analytically intractable integer partitions, we
can only obtain the peak network-wide secrecy throughput via
one-dimensional exhaustive search.
In our analysis, due to uncoordinated concurrent transmis-
sions, the aggregate interference at a receiver dominates ther-
mal noise. For tractability, we consider the interference-limited
case by ignoring thermal noise. Nevertheless, our results can
be easily generalized to the case with thermal noise. For ease
of notation, we define δ , 2/α, Cα,N , πΓ(N−1+δ)Γ(1−δ)Γ(N−1) ,
and Pab , Pa/Pb for a, b ∈ {h, f, t}.
III. SINGLE-ANTENNA-JAMMING FD RECEIVER
In this section, we consider the scenario where each FD Rx
uses single-antenna jamming, i.e., Nt = 1. Thereby, matrices
F , H and G given in (1)-(3) reduce to vectors f , h, and g,
respectively, and vector v reduces to scalar v. Without lose
of generality, we consider a typical FD Tx-Rx pair (oˆ, o). We
first analyze the connection probability and the secrecy outage
probability of the typical FD Rx, and then maximize network-
wide secrecy throughput by optimizing the density of the FD
tier.
To counteract the SI and simultaneously strengthen the
desired signal, the weight vector wf at the FD Rx’s input can
be chosen according to a hybrid ZF-MRC criterion4, which is
wf =
fHoˆoUU
H
‖fHoˆoU‖
, (7)
where U ∈ C(Nf−1)×(Nf−2) is the projection matrix onto the
null space of vector fHoo such that the columns of
[
fHoo
‖foo‖
,U
]
constitute an orthogonal basis. In this way, we have wffoo =
0.
A. Connection Probability
In this subsection, we investigate the connection probability
of the typical FD Rx. From (1) and (7), the SIR of the typical
FD Rx is given by
SIRf =
Pf‖fHoˆoU‖2D−αf
Ih + If
, (8)
where Ih ,
∑
zˆ∈Φˆh
Ph|wffzˆo|2D−αzˆo and If ,∑
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
(
Pf |wffzˆo|2D−αzˆo + Pt|wffzo|2D−αzo
)
are the
4ZF-MRC receiver might not be the optimal one, but it is really a simple yet
efficient alternative that yields an achievable secrecy rate/throughput. Limiting
the receiver in the null space of SI successfully avoids the SI invasion in the
spatial domain without consuming extra circuit power that would be used for
SI cancellation in the analog or digital domain.
aggregate interferences from the HD tier and FD tier,
respectively. In the following theorem, we provide a general
expression of the exact connection probability Pt.
Theorem 1: The connection probability of a typical FD Rx
is
Pt =
Nf−3∑
m=0
(−1)m
m!
(
Dαf βt
Pf
)m
×
(
e−λhCα,2(Phs)
δLIf
(
Dαf βt/Pf
))(m)
, (9)
where LIf (s) denotes the Laplace transform of If , i.e.,
LIf (s) = exp
(
− λf
∫ ∞
0
(
2π −
∫ 2π
o
1
1 + Pfsr−α
×
dθ
1 + Pts(r2 +D2f − 2rDf cos θ)−α/2
)
rdr
)
. (10)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Theorem 1 provides an exact connection probability with-
out requiring time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations. A
special case is that when Nf = 3, Pt simplifies to
e−λhCα,2(Phs)
δLIf
(
Dαf βt/Pf
)
. However, for the more gen-
eral case, the double integral term in (10) makes computing
L(m)If (s) quite difficult, thus making (9) rather unwieldy to
analyze. This motivates the need for more compact forms, and
in the following theorem we provide closed-form lower and
upper bounds for Pt.
Theorem 2: The connection probability Pt of a typical FD
Rx is lower bounded by PLt and upper bounded by PUt ; which
share the same closed form given below,
PSt = e−Λ
S
f β
δ
t + e−Λ
S
f β
δ
t
Nf−3∑
m=1
1
m!
×
m∑
n=1
(
δΛSf β
δ
t
)n
Υm,n, ∀S ∈ {L,U} (11)
where ΛLf , Cα,2D2f
(
P δhfλh +
(
1 + P δtf
)
λf
)
,
ΛUf , Cα,2D
2
f
(
P δhfλh +
1+δ
2
(
1 + P δtf
)
λf
)
and
Υm,n =
∑
ψj∈comb(m−1m−n)
∏
lij∈ψj
i=1,··· ,m−n
(lij − δ(lij − i+ 1)).
Here comb
(
m−1
m−n
)
denotes the set of all distinct subsets of the
natural numbers {1, 2, · · · ,m − 1} with cardinality m − n.
The elements in each subset are arranged in an increasing
order with lij the i-th element of ψj . For m ≥ 1, we have
Υm,m = 1.
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Although (11) still seems complicated, it is actually very
easy to compute without any integrals. Considering a practical
need of a high level of reliability, we concentrate on the large
probability region in which PSt → 1 for S ∈ {L,U}, and
provide a much simpler approximation for PSt in the following
corollary, which further facilitates the analysis.
Corollary 1: In the large probability region, i.e., Pt → 1,
PSt in (11) is approximated by
PSt ≈ 1− ΛSf βδtKα,Nf−2, ∀S ∈ {L,U} (12)
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where Kα,N = 1 +
∑N−1
m=1
1
m!
∏m−1
l=0 (l − δ).
Proof: We see from (11) that PSt → 1 as ΛSf → 0.
Here, ΛSf → 0 reflects all cases of system parameters such
as Df , λf and λh that may lead to a large PSt . A reasonable
case of ΛSf → 0 is but is not limited to that the Tx-Rx pair
distance is much less than the average distance between any
two Txs (or between two Rxs), i.e., D2fλf , D2fλh ≪ 1. Using
the first-order Taylor expansion with (11) around ΛSf = 0 and
discarding the high order terms Θ
((
ΛSf
)2)
, we complete the
proof.
The bound results given in Corollary 1 are shown in Fig.
2, in which we see in the large probability region the lower
bound PLt is tight to the exact value of Pt from Monte-Carlo
simulations. Therefore in subsequent analysis, we focus on
the lower bound PLt instead of Pt. Note that this is actually a
pessimistic evaluation of real connection performance. From
Fig. 2, we also find that connection performance deteriorates as
the FD tier density λf increases due to the additional amount
of interference. This is ameliorated by adding receive antennas
at the FD Rx.
Comparing (2) with (1), it is not difficult to conclude that
the connection probability Pc of a typical HD Rx shares a
similar form as Pt. Likewise, we can obtain an approximation
for Pc in the large probability region, which is provided by
the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Define Λh ,
Cα,2
(
λh +
(
P δfh + P
δ
th
)
λf
)
D2h. In the large probability
region, the connection probability Pc of a typical HD Rx is
approximated by
Pc ≈ 1− ΛhβδcKα,Nh . (13)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we investigate the secrecy outage prob-
ability which corresponds to the probability that a secret
message is decoded by at least one eavesdropper in the
network.
To guarantee secrecy, we should not underestimate the wire-
tap capability of eavesdroppers. Thereby, we consider a worst-
case wiretap scenario assuming that all eavesdroppers have
multiuser decoding capabilities (e.g., successive interference
cancellation), thus each eavesdropper itself can successfully
resolve the signals radiated from those unexpected transmitters
and remove them from its received signals5 [16]. In this way,
the aggregate interference received at each eavesdropper only
consists of the jamming signals emitted by all the FD Rxs.
We assume that eavesdroppers use the optimal linear receiver,
i.e., the minimum mean square error (MMSE) receiver [33], to
strengthen the received signals. From (3), the weight vector of
the eavesdropper located at e when using the MMSE receiver
is
we = R
−1
e goˆe, (14)
where Re , PtgoegHoeD−αoe +
∑
z∈Φf\o
Ptgzeg
H
zeD
−α
ze , and
the resulting SIR is given by
SIRe = PfgHoˆeR−1e goˆeD−αoˆe . (15)
In the following theorem, we provide a general expression of
the exact secrecy outage probability.
Theorem 3: The secrecy outage probability Pso of a typical
FD Rx is
Pso = 1− exp
(
− λe
Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,1)∑
i=0
(
Cα,2λf (Ptfβe)
δ
)n−i
(n− i)!∫ ∞
0
Qi(r)r2(n−i)e−Cα,2λf (Ptfβe)δr2rdr
)
, (16)
where Qi(r) =
∫ 2π
0
(Ptfβe(r/
√
r2+D2f−2rDf cos θ)
α
)
i
1+Ptfβe(r/
√
r2+D2f−2rDf cos θ)
α dθ.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
The double integral in (16) makes Pso difficult to analyze.
Note that, in a large-scale DWN, a Tx is generally a simple
node with low transmit power, e.g., a sensor, and has very short
coverage. Therefore, to guarantee a reliable communication
and meanwhile protect information from eavesdropping, the
separation distance Df between a Tx-Rx pair is usually
set small. In view of this, in order to develop useful and
meanwhile tractable insights into the behavior of the secrecy
outage probability Pso, we resort to an asymptotic analysis
by considering a small Df regime, e.g., Df → 0, and provide
quite a simple approximation for Pso in Corollary 3. We stress
that, although Corollary 3 is obtained by assuming Df → 0, it
applies more generally. As can be seen in Fig. 3, (17) provides
a very accurate approximation for the exact value in (16) for
quite a wide range of Df . This illustrates the rationality of
the given hypothesis. Hereafter, unless specified otherwise, we
focus on the case Df → 0 when referring to the secrecy outage
probability Pso of the typical FD Rx.
Corollary 3: In the small Df regime, i.e., Df → 0, Pso in
(16) is approximated by
Pso ≈ 1− exp
[
− πλe
Cα,2λfP δtfβ
δ
e
(
Ne − 1 + 1
1 + Ptfβe
)]
.
(17)
5Successfully decoding multiplex signals actually depends on the so-called
‘capacity range’, which is extremely hard to analyze if we have more than two
users. In this paper, we are not going to spend time to analyze the complicated
multiplex channel capacity, instead we consider the eavesdropping capacity of
successive interference cancellation, which is actually the worse case scenario.
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Proof: Please see Appendix D.
Fig. 4 shows that the approximated values in (17) for the
secrecy outage probability Pso are quite close to the exact
results of Monte-Carlo simulations. The value of Pso gets
larger as either the number Ne of eavesdropper’s antennas
or the density λe of eavesdroppers increases. To reduce the
secrecy outage probability, we should better deploy more FD
jammers, i.e., increasing the value of λf .
Although eavesdroppers do not collude with each other, they
may use large antennas for better wiretapping. Considering
that the value of Ne goes to infinity, Pso in (17) reduces to
Pso = 1− exp
(
− πλeNe
Cα,2λfP δtfβ
δ
e
)
. (18)
We observe from (18) that Pso increases as α increases. This
is because, in an environment of a larger path loss, jamming
signals have undergone stronger attenuation before they arrive
at the eavesdroppers.
C. Network-wide Secrecy Throughput
In this subsection, we investigate network-wide secrecy
throughput Ts under a connection probability Pt(βt) = σ and
a secrecy outage constraint Pso(βe) = ǫ, which is defined in
(6). Clearly, if β∗t ≤ β∗e , a positive Ts that simultaneously
satisfies the given probabilities does not exists, thus, transmis-
sions should be suspended. Note that although increasing the
density λf of the FD tier may increase network-wide secrecy
throughput Ts, it introduces greater interference to the HD tier,
thus reducing network-wide throughput Tc. To achieve a good
balance, we should carefully choose the value of λf . In the
following, we aim to maximize Ts by optimizing λf under
a guarantee that Tc lies above a target throughput Tc. This
optimization problem is formulated as
max
λf
Ts, s.t. Tc ≥ Tc. (19)
To proceed, we first calculate β∗t and β∗e from Pt(βt) = σ
and Pso(βe) = ǫ, respectively. In general, the analytical
expressions of the exact β∗t and β∗e are unavailable due to the
complexity of (9) and (16); we can only numerically calculate
β∗t and β∗e , which makes solving problem (19) extremely
difficult. To facilitate the analysis and provide useful insights
into network design, we resort to some approximate results
of the connection and secrecy outage probabilities. To ensure
a high level of reliability, the connection probability σ is
expected to be large, which allow us to use (12) to calculate
β∗t .
Lemma 1: In the large σ regime, i.e., σ → 1, the root βt
of the equation Pt(βt) = σ is given by
β∗t =
 1− σ
Cα,2D2fKα,Nf−2
(
P δhfλh + (1 + P
δ
tf )λf
)

α
2
.
(20)
Proof: Recalling Corollary 1, we obtain (20) by solving
the equation 1− ΛLf βδtKα,Nf−2 = σ.
Considering the scenario of large-antenna eavesdroppers,
i.e., Ne ≫ 1, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: In the large Ne regime, the root βe of the
equation Pso(βe) = ǫ is given by
β∗e =
1
Ptf
(
πλeNe
Cα,2λf ln
1
1−ǫ
)α
2
. (21)
Proof: Recalling (18), we obtain (21) by solving the
equation 1− e−πλeNe/(Cα,2λfP δtfβδe) = ǫ.
Having obtained β∗t in (20) and β∗e in (21), we begin
to solve problem (19). Since we focus on variable λf , we
substitute (6) into (19), and reform problem (19) as follows
by introducing an auxiliary function F (λf ) which shows
explicitly the relationship between objective function Ts and
λf ,
max
λf
Ts = σ
ln 2
[F (λf )]
+
, s.t. 0 < λf ≤ λUf , (22)
where F (λf ) = λf ln 1+X(1+Y λf )
−α/2
1+Zλ
−α/2
f
, λUf ,
(1−σc)/(Cα,2D2hKα,Nh)(2
Tc/(λhσc)−1)
−δ
−λh
P δth+P
δ
fh
is obtained
from Tc = λhσc log(1 + β∗c ) = Tc in (19), and
X ,
(
1−σ
Cα,2D2fKα,Nf−2P
δ
hfλh
)α/2
, Y ,
1+P δtf
P δhfλh
and
Z , 1Ptf
(
πλeNe
Cα,2 ln
1
1−ǫ
)α/2
. To achieve a positive Ts in
(22), F (λf ) > 0, i.e., X(1 + Y λf )−α/2 > Zλ−α/2f must be
guaranteed, and thus we have λf > λLf , 1/
(
(X/Z)δ − Y
)
8and (X/Z) > Y α2 , which further yield
(1 − σ) ln 1
1− ǫ > πλeNeD
2
fKα,Nf−2
(
1 + P−δtf
)
. (23)
That is to say, a large σ and a small ǫ might not be simulta-
neously promised. In the following, we consider the case that
a positive Ts exists, i.e., λf > λLf . Thereby, problem (22) is
equivalent to
max
λf
F (λf ), s.t. λ
L
f < λf ≤ λUf . (24)
In the following theorem, we can prove the quasi-concavity
[38, Sec. 3.4.2] of F (λf ) w.r.t. λf in the range (λLf ,∞), and
derive the optimal λf that maximizes F (λf ) (or Ts).
Theorem 4: The optimal density λf that maximizes
network-wide secrecy throughput Ts is
λ∗f =
{
min(λ⋆, λUf ), (X/Z) > Y
α
2 and λLf ≤ λUf ,
∅, otherwise,
(25)
where λ⋆ is the unique root of the following equation,
ln
f1(λ)
f2(λ)
+
α
2 f1(λ)[f2(λ) − 1]− α2 λ[f1(λ) − f2(λ)]Y
f1(λ)f2(λ)(1 + λY )
= 0,
(26)
with f1(λ) = 1+X(1+Y λ)−
α
2 and f2(λ) = 1+Zλ−
α
2
. The
left-hand side (LHS) of (26) is first positive and then negative;
thus, the value of λ⋆ can be efficiently calculated using the
bisection method. Here, λ∗f = ∅ means no λf can produce a
positive Ts under a given pair (σ, ǫ).
Proof: Please see Appendix E.
Theorem 4 indicates that by properly choosing the value
of λf , we can achieve the maximum network-wide secrecy
throughput for the FD tier while guaranteeing a minimum
required network-wide throughput for the HD tier. Substituting
the optimal λ∗f into (22) yields the maximum T ∗s , which is
shown in Fig. 5. Just as analyzed previously, only those σ and
ǫ that satisfy (23) can yield a positive T ∗s . While T ∗s increases
in ǫ, T ∗s initially increases in σ and then decreases in it. The
underlying reason is, too small a σ corresponds to a small
probability of successful transmission, whereas too large a σ
limits the transmission rate; either aspect results in a small
T ∗s , as can be seen from (6).
In addition to the density of the FD tier λf , the jamming
power of the FD Rx Pt 6 also triggers a non-trivial tradeoff
between transmission reliability and secrecy, thus impacting
network-wide secrecy throughput Ts. Similar to Theorem 4,
we can also prove the quasi-concavity of Ts on Pt, which is
validated in Fig. 6. We observe that, in a certain range of λf ,
how Ts varies w.r.t. λf heavily depends on the value of Pt.
For example, if at the small Pt regime Ts increases in λf , Ts
might decrease in λf in the large Pt regime.
IV. MULTI-ANTENNA-JAMMING FD RECEIVER
In this section, we consider the scenario of the FD Rx
using multi-antenna jamming. Thanks to the extra degrees of
freedom provided by multiple jamming antennas, each FD Rx
6Since we only focus on the optimization of network density, the power
control issue is outside the scope of this paper.
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is able to inject jamming signals into the null space of the
SI channel such that SI will not leak out to the Rx’s input,
and MRC reception can be simply adopted at the input for the
desired signal. This is inspired by the idea of the artificial noise
scheme proposed in [17]. We will see the analysis of multi-
antenna jamming is much more different from and much more
sophisticated than that of single-antenna jamming.
Without lose of generality, we consider a typical FD Rx at
the origin o. The details of SSIC are given as follows. We
first use MRC reception at the input of the typical FD Rx,
the weight vector of which can be obtained from (1), i.e.,
w˜f =
fHoˆo
‖foˆo‖
. Here we use superscript ˜ to distinguish the
multi-antenna jamming case from the single-antenna jamming
case. We then design the jamming signal vo in (1) in the
form of vo = F˜ov˜o, where v˜o ∈ CNj×1 is an Nj-stream
jamming signal vector with i.i.d. entries v˜i ∼ CN (0, 1/Nj)
and Nj ≤ Nt − 1, F˜o ∈ CNt×Nj is the projection ma-
trix onto the null space of vector (w˜fFoo)H such that the
columns of
[
(w˜fFoo)
H
‖w˜fFoo‖
, F˜o
]
constitute an orthogonal basis, i.e.,
w˜fFoovo = 0. In this way, SI is completely eliminated in the
spatial domain. It is worth mentioning that, v˜o includes but
is not limited to an Nt − 1-stream signal vector. Although
Nt − 1-dimension null space should better be injected with
jamming signals to confuse eavesdroppers in a point-to-point
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20dBm, Nf = 8, λf = 10−3 and βt = 1.
transmission [17], there is no general conclusion from the
network perspective, since jamming signals impair not only
eavesdroppers but also legitimate users.
A. Connection Probability
From the above discussion, the SIR of the typical FD Rx
can be obtained from (1), which is
S˜IRf =
Pf‖foˆo‖2D−αf
I˜h + I˜f
, (27)
where I˜h ,
∑
zˆ∈Φˆh
Ph|w˜ffzˆo|2D−αzˆo and I˜f ,∑
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
(
Pf |w˜ffzˆo|2D−αzˆo + (Pt/Nj) ‖w˜fFzoF˜z‖2D−αzo
)
are the aggregate interferences from the HD and FD tiers,
respectively. Substituting (27) into (4) produces the connection
probability of the typical FD Rx, denoted by P˜t. As discussed
in the single-antenna jamming case, the exact expression of
P˜t can be derived, which however is not in an analytical
form. Instead, we provide a more tractable lower bound for
P˜t in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The connection probability P˜t of the typical
FD Rx is lower bounded by
P˜Lt = e−Λ˜
L
f β
δ
t
1 + Nf−Nt−1∑
m=1
1
m!
m∑
n=1
(
δΛ˜Lf β
δ
t
)n
Υm,n
 ,
(28)
where Λ˜Lf , Cα,2P δhfλhD2f + Cα,2λfD2f +
Cα,Nj+1 (Ptf/Nj)
δ
λfD
2
f and Υm,n has been defined
in (11).
Proof: Please see Appendix F.
To further facilitate the analysis, an approximation for P˜t
is provided by the following corollary.
Corollary 4: In the large probability region, i.e., P˜t → 1,
P˜t is approximated by
P˜t ≈ 1− Λ˜fβδtKα,Nf−Nt , (29)
where Λ˜f = Λ˜Lf and Kα,N has been defined in Corollary 1.
Fig. 7 shows that the result in (29) approximates to the
exact connection probability P˜t provided by Monte-Carlo
simulations. We see that P˜t greatly reduces as the number
Nt of jamming antennas increases. In addition, P˜t suffers
a slight decrease when the number Nj of jamming signal
streams increases. This implies when the value of Nt is fixed,
P˜t is less insensitive to the value of Nj .
Following similar steps in Theorem 5 and Corollary 4, an
approximation for the connection probability P˜c of a typical
HD Rx in the large probability region is given in the following
corollary.
Corollary 5: Define Λ˜h = Cα,2λhD2h + Cα,2P δfhλfD2h +
Cα,Nj+1 (Pth/Nj)
δ
λfD
2
h. In the large probability region, i.e.,
P˜c → 1, the connection probability P˜c of a typical HD Rx is
approximated by
P˜c ≈ 1− Λ˜hβδcKα,Nh. (30)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Assuming that every eavesdropper has the capability of
multiuser decoding and uses the MMSE receiver, the weight
vector of the eavesdropper located at e can be obtained from
(3), which is
w˜e = R˜
−1
e goˆe, (31)
where R˜e , (Pt/Nj)GoeF˜oF˜Ho GHoeD−αoe +∑
z∈Φf\o
(Pt/Nj)GzeF˜zF˜
H
z G
H
zeD
−α
ze ; the resulting SIR
is
S˜IRe = PfgHoˆeR˜−1e goˆeD−αoˆe . (32)
Due to the existence of multi-stream jamming signals,
computing secrecy outage probability requires using the in-
teger partitions of a positive integer [34]. For convenience,
we describe the integer partitions of a positive integer k by
introducing an integer partition matrix Θk . For example, the
integer partitions of 4 is characterized by
Θ4 =

4
3 1
2 2
2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
. (33)
In the following, we denote |ξk| as the number of rows of
Θk, and ξi,j,k , |ξj,k|, φi,j,k and |φj,k| as the i-th entry, the
number of entries, the number of the i-th largest entry and
the number of non-repeated entries in the j-th row of Θk,
respectively. We provide a closed-form expression for secrecy
outage probability P˜so in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: The secrecy outage probability of a typical
multi-antenna jamming FD Rx is
P˜so = 1− exp
(
− πλe
Cα,Nj+1λf
Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,Nj)∑
i=0
(
Nj
i
)
×
(Ptfβe/Nj)
i−δ
(1 + Ptfβe/Nj)
Nj
|ξn−i|∑
j=1
(−1)|ξj,n−i||ξj,n−i|!Ξj,n−i
)
, (34)
where Ξj,n =
∏|ξj,n|
m=1
∏ξm,j,n
k=1
(Nj+1−k)(k−1−δ)
k(Nj−k+δ)∏|φj,n|
i=1 φi,j,n!
. Here, we let
|ξ0| = 1, |ξj,0| = 0 and Ξj,0 = 1.
Proof: Please see Appendix G.
We see that secrecy outage probability P˜so is affected by
the number Nj of jamming signal streams rather than the
10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
 
 
X: 85
Y: 0.04323
S
ec
re
cu
O
u
ta
g
e
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y,
P˜
s
o
Number of Jamming Signal Streams, Nj
Simulation, Ne = 8, λf = 10
−4
Simulation, Ne = 6, λf = 10
−4
Simulation, Ne = 8, λf = 5 × 10
−4
Simulation, Ne = 6, λf = 5 × 10
−4
Theory, (34), Ne = 8, λf = 10
−4
Theory, (34), Ne = 6, λf = 10
−4
Theory, (34), Ne = 8, λf = 5 × 10
−4
Theory, (34), Ne = 6, λf = 5 × 10
−4
Nj → ∞, Ne = 8, λf = 10
−4
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number Nt of jamming antennas. The result in (34) is well
verified by Monte-Carlo simulations, just as shown in Fig. 8.
To better understand the effect of Nj on P˜so, we investigate
the asymptotic behavior of P˜so w.r.t. Nj by considering the
cases Nj = 1 and Nj →∞, respectively.
Corollary 6: When Nj = 1, P˜so in (34) shares the same
expression as the one given in (17).
Proof: Substituting Nj = 1 into Ξj,n−i, we have
Ξj,n−i = 0 for j < |ξn−i|. Since the |ξn−i|-th integer partition
of n−i (i.e., the last row of Θn−i) must be n−i ones, we have
|φ|ξn−i|,n−i|=1 and |ξ|ξn−i|,n−i| = φ1,|ξn−i|,n−i. Therefore,
the term
∑|ξn−i|
j=1 (−1)|ξj,n−i||ξj,n−i|!Ξj,n−i in (34) reduces
to (−1)|ξ|ξn−i|,n−i||ξ|ξn−i|,n−i|!Ξ|ξn−i|,n−i = 1, substituting
which into (34) completes the proof.
Corollary 6 implies emitting a single-stream jamming signal
using multiple antennas has the same effect as single-antenna
jamming in confounding eavesdroppers.
Corollary 7: As Nj → ∞, P˜so in (34) tends to the
following constant value
1− exp
(
− λe
Γ(1− δ)λf
Ne−1∑
n=0
n∑
i=0
e−Ptfβe
i!(Ptfβe)δ−i
×
|ξn−i|∑
j=1
|ξj,n−i|!
∏|ξj,n−i|
m=1
∏ξm,j,n−i
k=1
k−1−δ
k
(−1)|ξj,n−i|∏|φj,n−i|i=1 φi,j,n−i!
)
. (35)
Proof: Invoking limN→∞ Γ(N+δ)Γ(N)Nδ = 1 and
limN→∞
(
1 + xN
)N
= ex in (34) directly yields (35).
Corollary 7 implies increasing jamming signal streams
can not arbitrarily reduce secrecy outage probability, just as
validated in Fig. 8. This is because the total power Pt of
jamming signals is limited. Conversely, if Pt in (35) goes to
infinity, P˜so reduces to zero.
C. Network-wide Secrecy Throughput
The network-wide secrecy throughput T˜s in multi-antenna
jamming scenario under a connection probability P˜t(βt) = σ
and a secrecy outage probability P˜so(βe) = ǫ has the same
form as (6). We aim to optimize λf to maximize T˜s while
guaranteeing a certain level of the HD tier throughput, i.e.,
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Fig. 9: Network-wide secrecy throughput vs. λf for different values of Nj ,
with Pt = 20dBm, Nf = Ne = 8, Nt = 6, λe = 10−4, σ = σc = 0.9,
ǫ = 0.02 and Tc = 10−3. The dashed lines show the values of T˜s without
an HD tier throughput constraint, i.e. Tc = 0.
T˜c ≥ Tc, with T˜c sharing the form of Tc given in Sec. II-A.
Before proceeding to the optimization problem, we compute
β∗t and β∗e from the equations P˜t(βt) = σ and P˜so(βe) = ǫ,
respectively.
Proposition 1: In the large probability region, i.e., σ → 1,
the root of P˜t(βt) = σ is given by
β∗t =
 (1− σ) /
(
Cα,2D
2
fKα,Nf−Nt
)
P δhfλh +
(
1 +
Cα,Nj+1
Cα,2
(
Ptf
Nj
)δ)
λf

α/2
. (36)
Proof: Recalling Corollary 4, (36) is obtained by solving
1− Λ˜fβδtKα,Nf−Nt = σ.
Generally, it is impossible to derive a closed-form expres-
sion for β∗e due to the complicated integer partitions in (34).
However, an analytical approximation for β∗e can be readily
obtained from (17) by considering the single jamming signal
stream, i.e., Nj = 1, in the large-antenna eavesdropper case.
Proposition 2: When Ne ≫ 1 and Nj = 1, βe that satisfies
P˜so(βe) = ǫ has the same expression as the one given in (21).
For the more general case Nj ≥ 2, the value of β∗e can be
obtained via numerical calculation, i.e., β∗e = P˜−1so (ǫ), where
P˜−1so (ǫ) is the inverse function of P˜so(βe).
In Fig. 9, we illustrate some numerical examples of
network-wide secrecy throughput T˜s. We see that T˜s first
increases and then decreases as the FD tier density λf in-
creases. The value of λf should be properly chosen in order
to maximize T˜s. We also find that, T˜s improves as the number
Nj of jamming signal streams increases on the premise of a
fixed number Nt of jamming antennas.
Next, we formulate the problem of maximizing network-
wide secrecy throughput T˜s as follows,
max
λf
T˜s = λfσ
ln 2
[
ln
1 + X˜(1 + Y˜ λf )
−α/2
1 + P˜−1so (ǫ)
]+
, (37a)
s.t. 0 < λf ≤ λ˜Uf , (37b)
where λ˜Uf ,
(1−σc)/(D
2
hKα,Nh )(2
Tc/(λhσc)−1)
−δ
−Cα,2λh
Cα,2P δfh+Cα,Nj+1(Pth/Nj)
δ is ob-
tained from T˜c = Tc, X˜ ,
(
1−σ
Cα,2D2fKα,Nf−NtP
δ
hfλh
)α
2
and
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Fig. 10: Optimal density of the FD tier vs. Nt for different values of Ne
and (a) λe = 2 × 10−4, (b) λe = 4 × 10−4, (c) λe = 7 × 10−4, (d)
λe = 10−3, with Pt = 20dBm, Nf = 8, Nj = Nt − 1, λf = 2× 10−3 ,
σ = σc = 0.9, ǫ = 0.02 and Tc = 10−3 . Note that λ∗f = 0 when
Nt = 2 in (c) and Nt = 2, 3 in (d). This means a positive secrecy throughput
that simultaneously satisfies the connection and secrecy outage probability
constraints can not be achieved, regardless of the value of λf .
Y˜ ,
Cα,2+Cα,Nj+1(Ptf/Nj)
δ
Cα,2P δhfλh
.
For the single jamming signal stream case Nj = 1, P˜−1so (ǫ)
has a closed-from expression given in (21), i.e., P˜−1so (ǫ) =
β∗e = Z˜λ
−α2
f with Z˜ ,
1
Ptf
(
πλeNe
Cα,2 ln
1
1−ǫ
)α
2
. Accordingly,
problem (37a) has the same form as problem (24). As a
consequence, the optimal λf that maximizes T˜s also shares
the same form as (25), simply with X , Y , Z and λUf replaced
by X˜ , Y˜ , Z˜ and λ˜Uf , respectively.
For the more general case Nj ≥ 2, we can only solve prob-
lem (37a) using one-dimension exhaustive search in the range
(0, λ˜Uf ]. Since increasing the number Nj of jamming signal
streams always benefits network-wide secrecy throughput, we
should set Nj = Nt − 1. Thus, Nt − 1-dimension null space
is fully injected with jamming signals. In Fig. 10 and Fig.
11, we illustrate the optimal density λ∗f and the corresponding
maximum network-wide secrecy throughput T˜ ∗s , respectively.
From Fig. 10, we observe a general trend that the value of
λ∗f decreases as Nt increases on the premise of the existence
of a positive T˜ ∗s . The reason behind is twofold: on one hand,
adding jamming antennas provides relief to deploying more
FD jammers to degrade the wiretap channels; on the other
hand, reducing the number of FD Tx-Rx pairs reduces network
interference, thus improving the main channels. How the value
of λ∗f is influenced by Ne depends on the specific values of
λe and Nt. For example, if each eavesdropper adds receive
antennas, more FD jammers are needed for a relatively small
Nt or a small λe (see (a), (b) and (c)), whereas fewer FD
jammers might be better as Nt or λe goes large (see Nt = 7
in (c) and Nt = 5 in (d)). This is because, if we continue to
add FD jammers, we can scarcely achieve a positive secrecy
throughput .
In Fig. 11, we see that the maximum network-wide secrecy
throughput T˜ ∗s always deteriorates as λe or Ne increases. How
the value of T˜ ∗s is affected by Nt depends on the specific
values of λe and Ne. Specifically, for relatively small values
of λe and Ne, T˜ ∗s decreases as Nt increases (see (a)). This
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Fig. 11: Maximum network-wide secrecy throughput vs. Nt for different
values of Ne and (a) λe = 2×10−4 , (b) λe = 4×10−4 , (c) λe = 7×10−4 ,
(d) λe = 10−3, with Pt = 20dBm, Nf = 8, Nj = Nt−1, λf = 2×10−3,
σ = σc = 0.9, ǫ = 0.02 and Tc = 10−3.
means we should use as few jamming antennas as possible.
However, as λe or Ne increases, T˜ ∗s first increases and then
decreases as Nt increases (see (b), (c) and (d)). This implies
that a modest value of Nt is required to balance improving
the main channels with degrading the wiretap channels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper comprehensively studies physical-layer security
using FD Rx jamming techniques against randomly located
eavesdropper in a heterogeneous DWN consisting of both
HD and FD tiers. The connection probability and the secrecy
outage probability of a typical FD Rx is analyzed for single-
and multi-antenna jamming scenarios, and the optimal FD
tier density is provided for maximizing network-wide secrecy
throughput under constraints including the given dual prob-
abilities and the network-wide throughput of the HD tier.
Numerical results are presented to validate our theoretical anal-
ysis, and show the benefits of FD Rx jamming in improving
network-wide secrecy throughput.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let s , Dαf βt/Pf and Io = Ih + If . Pt can be calculated
by substituting (8) into (4)
Pt = EIo
[
P
{‖fHoˆoU‖2 ≥ sIo}] (a)= EIo
e−sIo Nf−3∑
m=0
smImo
m!

=
Nf−3∑
m=0
EIo
[
sme−sIo
m!
Imo
]
(b)
=
Nf−3∑
m=0
[
smL(m)Io (s)
(−1)mm!
]
, (38)
where (a) holds for ‖fHoˆoU‖2 ∼ Γ(Nf − 2, 1), and (b) is
obtained from [32, Theorem 1]. Due to the independence of
Ih and If , LIo(s) is given by
LIo (s) = EIo
[
e−sIo
]
= LIh(s)LIf (s). (39)
LIh(s) can be directly obtained from [11, (8)], which is
LIh (s) = exp
(−λhCα,2(Phs)δ) . (40)
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LIf (s) = EIf
[
e−sIf
]
can be computed as
LIf (s) = EΦˆf
 ∏
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
e
−s
(
Pf |wffzˆo|
2
Dα
zˆo
+
Pt|wffzo|
2
Dαzo
) (41)
(c)
= EΦˆf
 ∏
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
1
1 + PfsD
−α
zˆo
1
1 + PtsD
−α
zo
 (42)
(d)
= exp
(
− λf
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
(
1− 1
1 + Pfsr−α
×
1
1 + Pts
(
r2 +D2f − 2rDf cos θ
)−α/2
)
rdθdr
)
, (43)
where (c) holds for |wffzˆo|2, |wffzo|2 ∼ Exp(1), and (d) is
derived by using the probability generating functional (PGFL)
over a PPP [36]. Substituting (40) and (43) into (39) completes
the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To provide a lower bound for Pt, we needs only provide
a lower bound for LIf (s). This is because, a lower bound
for LIf (s) actually overestimates the aggregate interference
If from the FD tier, which leads to a lower bound for Pt.
From (41), we have
LIf (s)
(e)
≥ EΦˆf
 ∏
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
e
−
sPf |wffzˆo|
2
Dα
zˆo
EΦf
 ∏
z∈Φf\o
e
−
sPt|wffzo|
2
Dαzo

(f)
= e−λfCα,2(Pf s)
δ
e−λfCα,2(Pts)
δ
, (44)
where (e) follows from the FKG inequality [35, The-
orem 10.13], since both ∏zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ e−sPf |wffzˆo|2D−αzˆo and∏
∈Φf\o
e−sPt|wffzo|
2D−αzo are decreasing random variables as
the number of terms increases; (f) holds for realizing that both
Φˆf \ oˆ and Φf \o are PPPs with the same density λf due to the
displacement theorem [35, page 35] and invoking [11, (8)].
Substituting (40) and (44) into (9) and invoking [32, Theo-
rem 1], we obtain the lower bound PLt .
An upper bound for Pt can be obtained by calculating an
upper bound for LIf . From (42), we have
LIf (s)
(g)
≤
EΦˆf
 ∏
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
1(
1 + PfsD
−α
zˆo
)2
EΦf
 ∏
z∈Φf\o
1(
1 + PtsD
−α
zo
)2

(h)
= exp
(
−λfCα,2 1 + δ
2
(Pfs)
δ(1 + P δtf )
)
, (45)
where (g) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and
(h) holds for the PGFL over a PPP. Substituting (40) and (45)
into (9) and invoking [32, Theorem 1], we obtain the upper
bound PUt .
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let r , Doˆe. Substituting (15) into (5) and applying the
PGFL over a PPP yield
Pso = 1−exp
(
−λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
P {SIRe ≥ βe} rdθdr
)
. (46)
Define v , rαβe/Pf , P {SIRe ≥ βe} in (46) can be calculated
by invoking [33, (11)], i.e.,
P {SIRe ≥ βe} = EΦf
[
1
W
Ne−1∑
n=0
wnv
n
]
, (47)
where W = (1 + PtD−αoe v)
∏
z∈Φf\o
(1 + PtD
−α
ze v), and wn
is the coefficient of vn in W , which is
wn =
min(n,1)∑
i=0
(
PtD
−α
oˆe
)i
(n− i)!
∑
z1,··· ,zn−i∈Φf\o
n−i∏
j=1
Pt
Dαzje
. (48)
Substituting W and wn into (47), we have
P {SIRe ≥ βe} = EΦf
[
Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,1)∑
i=0
1
(n− i)!×
(PtD
−α
oe v)
i(
1 + PtD
−α
oe v
) ∑
z1,··· ,zn−i∈Φf\o
Pn−it v
n−i
∏n−i
j=1D
−α
zje∏
z∈Φf\o
(
1 + PtD
−α
ze v
)]
=
Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,1)∑
i=0
(PtD
−α
oe v)
i(
1 + PtD
−α
oe v
)
(n− i)!×
EΦf
 ∑
z1,··· ,zn−i∈Φf\o
Pn−it v
n−i
∏n−i
j=1D
−α
zje∏
z∈Φf\o
(
1 + PtD
−α
ze v
)
 , (49)
where the expectation term can be calculated by using
Campbell-Mecke theorem [36, Theorem 4.2]
EΦf
 ∑
z1,··· ,zn−i∈Φf\o
Pn−it v
n−i
∏n−i
j=1D
−α
zje∏
z∈Φf\o
(
1 + PtD
−α
ze v
)

=
(
2πλf
∫ ∞
0
Ptvr
−α
1 + Ptvr−α
rdr
)n−i
×
exp
(
−2πλf
∫ ∞
0
Ptvr
−α
1 + Ptvr−α
rdr
)
(i)
=
(
Cα,2λfP
δ
t v
δ
)n−i
exp
(−Cα,2λfP δt vδ) , (50)
where (i) is obtained by transforming Ptvr−α → µ and
invoking formula [37, (3.241.2)]. Substituting (49) and (50)
into (46) and using Doˆe =
√
D2oe +D
2
f − 2DoeDf cos θo, we
complete the proof.
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D. Proof of Corollary 3
As Df → 0, Qi(r) = 2π (Ptfβe)i/(1 + Ptfβe). Let A ,
Cα,2λf (Ptfβe)
δ
. Substituting Qi(r) into (16) yields
Pso = 1− exp
(
− λe
Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,1)∑
i=0
An−i
(n− i)!×
2π (Ptfβe)
i
1 + Ptfβe
∫ ∞
0
r2(n−i)e−Ar
2
rdr
)
(j)
= 1− exp
−λe Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,1)∑
i=0
π
A
(Ptfβe)
i
1 + Ptfβe

= 1− exp
(
− πλe
A(1 + Ptfβe)
Ne−1∑
n=0
(1 + Ptfβe)
n
)
, (51)
where (j) holds for ∫∞
0
r2(n−i)e−Arrdr = (n−i)!An−i+1 . Substitut-
ing A into (51) completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
To complete the proof, we need only derive the optimal λf ,
denoted by λ⋆f , that maximizes F (λf ) in the range [λLf ,∞).
Clearly, if 0 < λLf ≤ λUf , the solution to problem (24)
is λ∗f = min(λ⋆f , λUf ); otherwise, there is no feasible solu-
tion. For convenience, we omit subscript f from λf . Define
f1(λ) = 1+X(1+Y λ)
−α2 > 1, f2(λ) = 1+Zλ
−α2 > 1 and
f(λ) = ln f1(λ)f2(λ) , then the objective function in (24) changes
into F (λ) = λf(λ). The first-order derivative of F (λ) on λ
is given by
F (1)(λ) = f(λ) + λf (1)(λ) = f(λ)G(λ). (52)
The introduced auxiliary function G(λ) in (52) is defined as
G(λ) = 1 + λf
(1)(λ)
f(λ) , where
f (1)(λ) =
f
(1)
1 (λ)
f1(λ)
− f
(1)
2 (λ)
f2(λ)
, (53)
with f (1)1 (λ) = −α(f1(λ)−1)Y2(1+λY ) and f (1)2 (λ) = −α(f2(λ)−1)2λ .
Note that f(λ) in (52) is positive, such that the sign of F (1)(λ)
remains consistent with that of G(λ). First, we investigate the
sign of F (1)(λ) at the boundaries of [λLf ,∞). A complete
expression of F (1)(λ) is given by substituting (53) into (52)
F (1)(λ) = ln
f1(λ)
f2(λ)
+
f1(λ)[f2(λ)− 1]− λ[f1(λ)− f2(λ)]Y
δf1(λ)f2(λ)(1 + λY )
.
(54)
Case λ = λLf : We have f1(λL) = f2(λL), such that
F (1)(λL) = f1(λ
L)[f1(λ
L)−1]
δf21 (λ
L)(1+λLY )
> 0.
Case λ → ∞: We have limλ→∞ f1(λ) = 1
and limλ→∞ f2(λ) = 1, such that limλ→∞ F (1)(λ) =
[f2(λ)−1]−λ[f1(λ)−f2(λ)]Y
δ(1+λY ) . Substituting f1(λ) and f2(λ) into
limλ→∞ F
(1)(λ) yields
lim
λ→∞
F (1)(λ) = lim
λ→∞
Zλ−α/2
(
1− X
Z
Y
(
λ
1 + λY
)α/2+1)
= lim
λ→∞
Zλ−α/2
(
1− X
Z
Y −α/2
)
< 0, (55)
where the last inequality holds for λLf = 1/
(
(X/Z)δ − Y
)
>
0 ⇒ (XY −α/2) /Z > 1. The above two cases also indicate
that G(λL) > 0 and limλ→∞G(λ) < 0.
Directly proving the monotonicity of F (1)(λ) (or the con-
cavity of F (λ)) w.r.t. λ from (52) is quite difficult. We observe
that, supposing G(λ) monotonically decreases with λ, there
obviously exists a unique λ⋆ that makes F (1)(λ) first positive
and then negative after λ exceeds λ⋆. That is, we may prove
that F (λ) is a first-increasing-then-decreasing function of λ.
Invoking the definition of the single-variable quasi-concave
function [38, Sec. 3.4.2], F (λ) is actually a quasi-concave
function of λ; the given λ⋆ is the optimal solution that
maximizes F (λ), which is obtained at F (1)(λ) = 0. Based
on the above discussion, in what follows we focus on proving
the monotonicity of G(λ) w.r.t. λ. We first compute the first-
order derivative of G(λ) on λ
G(1)(λ) =
f (1)(λ)f(λ) + λf (2)(λ)f(λ) − λ (f (1)(λ))2
f2(λ)
.
(56)
Computing G(1)(λ) requires computing f (2)(λ), which can be
obtained from (53)
f (2)(λ) =
f
(2)
1 (λ)f1(λ)− (f (1)1 (λ))2
f21 (λ)
− f
(2)
2 (λ)f2(λ)− (f (1)2 (λ))2
f22 (λ)
, (57)
where f (2)1 (λ) =
(α/2+1)(f1(λ)−1)Y
2
δ(1+λY )2 and f
(2)
2 (λ) =
(α/2+1)(f2(λ)−1)
δλ2 are the second-order derivatives of f1(λ) and
f2(λ), respectively, substituting which into (57) further yields
f (2)(λ) =
(f1(λ) − 1)(f1(λ) + α/2)Y 2
δ(f1(λ))2(1 + λY )2
− (f2(λ) − 1)(f2(λ) + α/2)
δλ2(f2(λ))2
. (58)
Substituting (53) and (58) into (56) yields
G(1)(λ) =
1
f(λ)
{
− (f1(λ)− 1)Y
δf1(λ)(1 + λY )
+
(f2(λ) − 1)
δλf2(λ)
+
λ(f1(λ)− 1)(f1(λ) + α/2)Y 2
δf21 (λ)(1 + λY )
2
− (f2(λ)− 1)(f2(λ) + α/2)
δλf22 (λ)
− λ
f(λ)
(
− (f1(λ) − 1)Y
δf1(λ)(1 + λY )
+
(f2(λ)− 1)
δλf2(λ)
)2}
. (59)
Using the inequality f(λ) = ln f1(λ)f2(λ) ≤
f1(λ)
f2(λ)
− 1 and after
some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
G(1)(λ) ≤ −f
2
1 (λ)
δf(λ)
[f2(λ) − 1]− λf1(λ)Y
δf(λ)
×(
f2(λ)[f1(λ)− 1] + α[f2(λ)− 1][f1(λ)− f2(λ)]
)
− λ
2f2(λ)Y
2
δf(λ)
[f2(λ) − 1][f1(λ) − f2(λ)]2. (60)
Given that f1(λ) > f2(λ) > 1, all the coefficients of Y i for
i = 0, 1, 2 in the right-hand side (RHS) of (60) are negative,
such that G(1)(λ) < 0. This means G(λ) is a monotonically
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decreasing function of λ in the range [λLf ,∞). By now, we
have completed the proof.
F. Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is similar to Appendix B; the only difference lies
in computing LIf (s), which is obtained from (27) and (44)
LIf (s) = EΦˆf
 ∏
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
e
−s
(
Pf |w˜ffzˆo|
2
Dα
zˆo
+
Pt
Nj
‖w˜fFzoF˜z‖
2
Dαzo
) ≥
EΦf
 ∏
z∈Φf\o
e
−
sPf |w˜f fzˆo|
2
Dα
zˆo
EΦˆf
 ∏
zˆ∈Φˆf\oˆ
e
−
sPt
Nj
‖w˜fFzoF˜z‖
2
Dαzo

(k)
= e−Cα,2λfD
2
f e−Cα,Nj+1(Ptf/Nj)
δλfD
2
f , (61)
where (k) holds for [11, (8)] combined with ‖w˜fFzoF˜z‖2 ∼
Γ(Nj , 1). Substituting (40) and (61) into (9) and invoking [32,
Theorem 1], we complete the proof.
G. Proof of Theorem 6
Following (46), we first compute P
{
S˜IRe ≥ βe
}
. Recalling
(32), each term in R˜e, e.g., GzeF˜zF˜Hz GHze, can be regarded
as a superposition of single-stream signals with Nj co-located
interferers. Denote the n-th column of GzeF˜z by g˜ze,n, then
Re,Nt,Nj can be reformed as
R˜e =
Pt
Nj
Nj∑
n=1
g˜oe,ng˜
H
oe,n
D−αoe
+
∑
z∈Φf\o
Pt
Nj
Nj∑
n=1
g˜ze,ng˜
H
ze,n
D−αze
. (62)
Define r , Doe and z , rαβePf . P
{
SIRe,Nt,Nj ≥ βe
}
is
obtained by invoking [33, (11)], i.e.,
P
{
S˜IRe ≥ βe
}
= EΦf
[
1
WNj
Ne−1∑
n=0
ynz
n
]
, (63)
where WNj =
(
1 + PtNj r
−αz
)Nj ∏
z∈Φf\o
(
1 + PtNjD
−α
ze z
)Nj
and yn is the coefficient of zn in the polynomial expansion
of WNj . Define A˜ , Cα,Nj+1λf (Ptfβe/Nj)
δ
. Invoking [34,
Theorem 1] yields
P
{
S˜IRe ≥ βe
}
=
Ne−1∑
n=0
min(n,Nj)∑
i=0
(
Nj
i
)(
Ptfβe
Nj
)i
×
|ξn−i|∑
j=1
Ξj,n−i(−A˜r2)|ξj,n−i|e−A˜r2
(1 + Ptfβe/(Nj))
Nj
, (64)
Substituting (64) into (46) and using Df → 0 and formula
[37, (3.326.2)], we complete the proof.
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